Showing posts with label neoliberalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label neoliberalism. Show all posts

Monday, October 10, 2022

Growth of what, for what?

"For GDP, producing $1bn of private jets is worth exactly the same as $1bn of affordable housing." — Jason Hickel

Thursday, June 18, 2020

'Cruel Optimism': Wanting something that isn't really good for you

Lauren Berlant's Cruel Optimism (2011)

The author doesn't use the term "Stockholm syndrome," but that's how I could most succinctly phrase her thesis in Cruel Optimism. Instead of having a love/hate relationship with a person who is your captor, however, you have a love/hate relationship with an idea to which you are captive. Somehow, remaining in the dynamic has come to seem better than the alternative.

Optimism — Berlant says in her Introduction — may be described as “the force that moves you out of yourself and into the world in order to bring closer the satisfying something that you cannot generate on your own but sense in the wake of a person, a way of life, an object, project, concept, or scene.” (What this force feels like is individual and variable.) “Even those whom you would think of as defeated are living beings figuring out how to stay attached to life from within it, and to protect what optimism they have for that, at least.” The term “cruel optimism” means that “something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing,” she says in the Introduction. This happens “when the object that draws your attachment actively impedes the aim that brought you to it initially,” or, in other words, “when the object/scene that ignites a sense of possibility actually makes it impossible to attain the expansive transformation for which a person or a people risks striving.” The feelings involved are also complex. One might feel “pleasures of being inside a relation” despite being “bound to a situation of profound threat”; this, too, is cruel. She is thinking in particular of “the fantasies that are fraying” in the late 20th and 21st centuries, like “upward mobility, job security, political and social equality, and lively, durable intimacy,” especially given our modern human condition that is so crisis-filled “that adjustment seems like an accomplishment.”

The period called “the impasse” is when a person “moves around with the sense that the world is at once intensely present and enigmatic, such that the activity of living demands both a wandering absorptive awareness and a hypervigilance that collects material that might help to clarify things, maintain one’s sea legs, and coordinate the standard melodramatic crises with those processes that have not yet found their genre of event.” In terms of the human ability to feel or function, an impasse is “temporary housing,” which is better than altogether falling apart.

A sudden event, yielding an aftermath “when one no longer knows what to do or how to live and yet, while unknowing, must adjust” is one kind of impasse. Another kind is “coasting through” a nameless status quo. (Chapter 6, p. 200)

“All attachments are optimistic.” (Chapter 1, p. 23) They are cruel when they present as "an affectively stunning double bind: a binding to fantasies that block the satisfactions they offer, and a binding to the promise of optimism as such that the fantasies have come to represent. Cruelty is the ‘hard’ in a hard loss. It is apprehensible as an affective event in the form of a beat or a shift in the air that transmits the complexity and threat of relinquishing ties to what’s difficult about the world." (Chapter 2, p. 51) The “double bind” is that “it is awkward and it is threatening to detach from what is already not working,” and that is why we sit in an “impasse of the present.” (Chapter 7, p. 263)

Lauren Berlant. Cruel Optimism. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2011.


"Tragic optimism," by contrast, "is the ability to maintain hope and find meaning in life despite its inescapable pain, loss and suffering," in the words of Emily Esfahani Smith in the New York Times. The word was coined by Holocaust survivor Viktor Frankl. She explains: "For a long time, many psychologists embraced a victim narrative about trauma, believing that severe stress causes long-lasting and perhaps irreparable damage to one’s psyche and health." Today, however, psychologists believe that a majority of trauma survivors "exhibit what’s known as post-traumatic growth. After a crisis, most people acquire a newfound sense of purpose, develop deeper relationships, have a greater appreciation of life and report other benefits."

So, "cruel optimism" is when you start off hopeful but life harms you, and "tragic optimism" is when you start off harmed but find hope. Perhaps that is oversimplified, but it seems to boil down to that.

Monday, April 6, 2020

How the have-it-both-ways "moderate" can begin to break out of the armchair

Joshua P. Hill: "Opposing something in any meaningful way does not simply mean expressing an opinion; opposition is not a state of mind, it’s a verb. And if 61% of Americans were in active opposition, were taking action to oppose Israel’s genocide and the U.S. government’s arming and funding of the genocide, it would end tomorrow." Hill continues:

"This paradigm shift, the turn from the concept of opposition as a position we take to opposition as the actions we take, applies across our world. We cannot just sit and say that climate change is a danger, we must organize and act for a sustainable future. We cannot just say that capitalism is hurting people and the planet and therefore we oppose it, we must build unions that struggle for the working class and organizations and institutions that make this battle for a better, freer future tangible and real. We must act and build the capacity to take increasingly powerful and meaningful collective actions."
— Joshua P. Hill, Opposition means Action: We must act to free Palestine and to free ourselves. New Means. Sep 04, 2024.


Writing in 1939, Max Lerner wrote this indictment of the typical "liberal." It would be a mistake to read this term using the 2020 American understanding of "liberal" vs. "conservative." It may refer to those who believe in liberal democracy (rather than any of its alternatives), but in context the best substitute term seems to be "moderate." The "liberal," here, is an armchair "moderate" who wants to have it both ways when it comes to judging others yet never taking firm action.

For to the public the liberal has become the caricature of the way he has presented himself. He is Mr. Janus Facing-Both-Ways. He sees two sides to every question (why only two?). He is Hamlet-like in his indecisiveness at a time when victory comes to those who can make up their minds. He is generous in his judgment of others and tolerant of their way of life. His principle is one of inclusiveness – not in the democratic sense of including his fellow-men in his orbit because of his camaraderie with them, but in the martyr-like sense of allowing others to say and do as they please even when he hates and is hurt by everything they stand for. He has an uneasy distrust of the capitalists, yet he feels that capitalism alone stands between him and anarchy. He is forever emphasizing the preciousness of the social heritage, the delicacy of the social fabric, and the danger of endangering either. His indignation at the denial of social justice mounts in direct proportion to its distance from himself. He will talk with unction about democracy, yet he fears the actions and passions of the democratic majorities. He is lofty in his attitude toward the masses and fluctuates among lip-service to their stereotypes (which he calls "public opinion"), uneasy fears when they begin to want something hard ("pressure groups"), and panic when they act to get it ("revolution"). His symbol is the swivel-chair, whether that of editor, columnist, or professor — and the best thing about it is that it can turn in so many directions. His ammunition is abstractions. His tenacity is nil. A purpose to him is like a work of art meticulously carved in butter.


The risk may be inherent to the intellectualization of politics. In 1941, Erich Fromm wrote that there is a type of "irrational doubt" that sticks with us until we achieve a "positive freedom," i.e. freedom that is not just "freedom from" something but is a "freedom to" be, do, or have something. And what that means is that we must achieve social connection and personal fulfillment before we can let go of a deep-seated sense (whether conscious or unconscious) of instability and insufficiency.

Doubt is the starting point of modern philosophy; the need to silence it had a most powerful stimulus on the development of modern philosophy and science. But although many rational doubts have been solved by rational answers, the irrational doubt has not disappeared and cannot disappear as long as man has not progressed from negative freedom to positive freedom. The modern attempts to silence it, whether they consist in a compulsive striving for success, in the belief that unlimited knowledge of facts can answer the quest for certainty, or in the submission to a leader who assumes the responsibility for 'certainty' — all these solutions can only eliminate the awareness of doubt. The doubt itself will not disappear as long as man does not overcome his isolation and as long as his place in the world has not become a meaningful one in terms of his human needs.

Peter Levine wrote in 2013:

The dangerous kind of ideology is highly intellectual. It proceeds from a few ideas — the fewer the better, for the sake of elegance. Its foundational principles are mutually consistent; contradictions would be embarrassing. Adherents of such ideologies make concrete, practical judgments by applying principles. * * * They are deadly when they seize control, because then people, organizations, and institutions that are inconsistent with their ideas are at grave risk. A healthy, helpful kind of ideology emerges in a different way.

Ideally, in politics, the goal "is never completely attainable because this politics is nothing more than a permanent challenge, a never-ending effort that can only in the best possible case leave behind it a certain trace of goodness," Levine said.

Of the best liberal activists, Levine said:

Their lives of struggle become compelling stories, enriched by their efforts to balance conflicting goals and values. Their disparate contributions are embraced by one or more political parties — or by other major political forces, such as coalitions within civil society. * * * By emphasizing liberalism’s pragmatic, experimental roots, I do not mean to deny its intellectual achievement. Jane Addams, for instance, was an extremely learned and insightful writer. But I suggest that in a healthy ideological movement, intellectual reflection follows practical experimentation, not the reverse.

Some limitations

Before we can begin to answer what kind of practical actions need to be taken, we have to recognize some parameters.

First of all, the type of pro-democracy activism that is most needed for you to do depends where you are.

"Most countries are neither full dictatorships nor consolidated democracies; they fall somewhere in the middle," Nicholas Cheeseman and Brian Klaas wrote in 2018. Thus, many countries "did not experience a moment of high-quality democracy and then gradually fall back into authoritarianism; rather, in most cases they simply shifted from one form of authoritarianism to another." For these countries, "it is more appropriate to talk about how we can strengthen or build democracy, rather than rescue or defend it.”

Or, to use Umair Haque's more specific suggestion from 2018: "The way to beat authoritarianism is to offer people a transformative new social contract." His point is that strengthening certain institutions can make the democratic system look more attractive than its authoritarian alternative.

The authoritarians have a radical plan to reconstruct society. Not a very thoughtful one — one based on hate and spite and fear. But the problem is that no one else offers an opposing one.

That is the difference between 'resistance' and opposition. Opposition says — radical change is coming, one way or the other, in a broken society. Here is the positive, beneficial kind, that creates the future, not just rewinds to the barbarities of the past. But if no such opposition exists, then a society can never beat authoritarianism....fighting authoritarians with cries of hypocrisy and evil does less than no good. You beat authoritarianism by repairing the broken society that gave rise to it.

Second, the more diverse a constituency, the more compromises the government must make to satisfy everyone's preferences, expectations, and needs. Homogeneous constituencies, by contrast, can tend towards extremism. What we may leap to criticize as mealy-mouthed moderateness may be a delicate line someone is treading, not primarily because they are an armchair philosopher who shies away from real debate, but because they are an actual political leader with diverse constituents to satisfy. Adam Serwer, in 2020:

The source of the GOP’s extremism, and the Democrats’ relative moderation, is not personal virtue. It is, rather, the fact that one party is relatively ideologically, religiously, and ethnically homogenous, while the other has to represent a constituency that is ideologically, religiously, and ethnically diverse. The Republican Party’s leadership and propaganda apparatus have trained their base to view Democratic voters not just as political rivals but as an existential threat, whose claims to American identity and therefore power are intrinsically invalid. This sense of being under siege allowed Trump to seize control of the party, to govern as though his voters are the only ones with legitimate claims to American citizenship, and to command absolute, unquestioning loyalty even as his ignorance and vanity prove lethal.

Because democracy is about compromise, most people in a democracy will not get everything they hoped for from their government. More pointedly, because democracy empowers majority coalitions to decide for minority populations, it means that some freedoms will be sacrificed to the system, generally in the hope that the system will, on the whole, preserve freedoms. This could be desirable on utilitarian grounds (i.e. the individual enjoys a net gain of freedom) or on deontological grounds (i.e. a democracy upholds certain freedoms that must be upheld at any price, even if the individual experiences a net loss of freedom). Jamie Bartlett, 2018:

Democracy is about individual liberty of course, but that’s only half the picture. It is also a system of coercion because your liberty must sometimes be taken away too....The moral basis for this control is the assertion that its laws and powers express the will of the people, and also protect certain fundamental rights.

Third, there is the recognition that mere knowledge doesn't always translate to power, and mere transparency isn't always activism. Garret Keizer, in 2012:

Even more than openness, the byword of the new prudery is information; its favorite motto, ‘Knowledge is power.’ You know you are in the presence of a confirmed knowledge-is-power type when your concerns about technologically enhanced surveillance are countered by the assertion that the same technologies are allowing citizens to watch the watchers. ‘Just the other day,’ you will be told, ‘some kid with a smartphone got pictures of these cops beating the crap out of a guy, and now they’re all over the Internet!’ I’ve gotten into the habit of remaining silent long enough for the speaker to grasp the implications of what he’s just said, but that can leave you speechless for the better part of a week. So what you’re telling me, I want to say, is that after more than two hundred years of constitutional government, police are still beating the crap out of citizens, but you feel empowered because somebody took a picture of it?

I don’t dispute that knowledge can lead to power or that access to information is essential to self-government, but I fear we have been bamboozled into believing that knowledge is itself power, that sitting in a coffee shop racking up ‘badges’ for your visits to muckraking websites makes you a revolutionary. For almost a decade now we have had the knowledge that there were never any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and I challenge anyone to stand with me next to the bed of a legless twenty-five-year-old Iraq War veteran and tell me that the knowledge was power. Power for whom?

In fact, the only sphere in which the mere possession of knowledge amounts to power is the sphere of individual privacy. If I know that my government has engaged in illegal wiretaps, that knowledge by itself is nothing but an illusion of power — and an illusion that the powerful may be quite happy for me to have. But if I know my neighbor is cheating on his wife, and he knows that I know, that is power, however pathetic and humiliating. Perhaps that is one reason for the voyeuristic streak in our culture: a bid for some kind of power on the part of otherwise impotent Peeping Toms.

Similarly, Jia Tolentino, in an essay reprinted in 2019, suggests that in observing the crimes of the rich and famous, we have access to imagine what it would be like to perpetrate those crimes. The real-life story is consumed almost in the way we consume fiction, for similar purposes.

The final, definitive scam for the millennial generation is the election of an open con artist to the presidency in 2016. Donald Trump is a lifelong scammer, out and proud and seemingly unstoppable. For decades before he entered politics, he peddled a magnificently fraudulent narrative about himself as a straight-talking, self-made, vaguely populist billionaire, and the fact that the lie was always in plain sight became a central part of his appeal. * * * As long as he’s rich and white and male and bigoted and rapacious, to many people he represents the most quintessentially American form of power and strength. He was elected for the same reason that people buy lottery tickets. It’s not the actual possibility of victory that you pay for; it’s the fleeting vision of victory. ... The pipe dream is becoming the dominant structure of aspiration, and its end-stage shadows — cruelty, carelessness, nihilism — are following close behind. After all, in becoming party to a scam, we access some of the hideous glory of scamming: we get to see, if not to actually experience, what it might be like to loot the place and emerge unscathed.

Fourth, it is usually neither our knowledge nor our virtue that determines whether we have war or peace. It is the dominant political "mood." Zat Rana in 2020:

...some philosopher or statesman between 500 or 2,500 years ago made an abstract, logical cause-and-effect argument that connected the idea of freedom (different from actually experiencing freedom) to our livelihood, and we spend most of our waking hours living under its banner, thinking that it is the real justification for why we do things today. And the fact that it isn't really why we do things in practice is, of course, very clear to anyone not living in our own little bubble. * * * Nations don't go to war based on some purified notion of freedom. That's either a post-hoc justification or a lie told to subdue the masses. Like any group, they go over the edge based on mood and momentum. * * * How much of your current outlook on the world is shaped by your own rational judgement of what is going on around us right now, and how much of it is simply opinions you externalize that were first absorbed and internalized from the cultural mood you predominantly identify with? The former isn't necessarily superior to the latter if the people you surround yourself with have strong collective judgement, but the question still provides good insight into whether your emotions actually reflect reality as they should or not.

Here's another way of posing the question. Marisa Kabas reports that "writer and panelist Andrea Grimes asked a few hours earlier during her [May 14, 2024 ComstockCon] discussion with historian Jules Gill-Peterson: “How do you break out of the mindset that compliance is more fulfilling than solidarity?”

Source

Max Lerner. It Is Later Than You Think: The Need for a Militant Democracy. New York: The Viking Press, 1939. p 5.

Erich Fromm. Escape from Freedom. New York: Avon, 1941. pp. 97-98.

Peter Levine. We Are the Ones We Have Been Waiting For: The Promise of Civic Renewal in America. Oxford University Press, 2013.

Nicholas Cheeseman and Brian Klaas. How to Rig an Election. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2018.

"Beating Authoritarianism Isn’t as Simple as You Think. It’s Even Simpler." Umair Haque. Eudaimonia (Medium). June 17, 2018.

“We Can Finally See the Real Source of Washington Gridlock.” Adam Serwer. The Atlantic. April 2, 2020. Accessed April 6, 2020.

Jamie Bartlett. The People Vs Tech: How the Internet Is Killing Democracy (and How We Save It). Dutton: April 5, 2018.

Garret Keizer. Privacy. New York: Picador, 2012. p. 38.

“The Election,” Jia Tolentino. Trick Mirror: Reflections on Self-Delusion. New York: Random House, 2019. pp. 215, 219-220.

Zat Rana. “Thinking Better, Together.” List email. 24 March 2020.

We have nothing if we don’t have solidarity: What the abortion rights movement can teach us about killing zombies, Marisa Kabas, The Handbasket, May 17, 2024.

Friday, January 4, 2019

Brink Lindsey's essay on small-r republicanism in National Affairs

"This essay is addressed to those conservatives and Republicans, from leaners to stalwarts, whose loyalties to movement and party are now badly strained or even severed," Brink Lindsey writes in his essay "Republicanism for Republicans" (National Affairs, Winter 2019). Strained or severed, that is, because the Republican Party "has been overrun by people or ideas you find repellent. And the things that attracted you in the first place — the intellectual seriousness of the 'party of ideas,' the optimism and idealism, the record of real-world policy accomplishments and skillful statesmanship — don't seem to count for much anymore." He acknowledges the "immense" nature of the project "to reconstruct the American right," given that the Republican Party "is overwhelmingly under the spell of Donald Trump and seems determined to plumb the depths of intellectual and moral self-abasement in the service of a cult of personality."

He wants conservative intellectuals to return to discourse about a small-r republic, "the ideal of political liberty achieved through popular self-government," an ideal which "saw political liberty not as the expression of some spontaneous general will, but as the artifact of constitutional structure: limits on power, checks and balances, and the rule of law." This form of government "rests on the civic virtue of the people, bound together as fellow citizens, who are called upon to uphold the public interest and safeguard it from corruption." Among the "small group of academic philosophers" who are interested in "republicanism as a theoretical alternative to liberalism," he counts Philip Pettit and Robert Taylor, saying that they emphasize "freedom as non-domination."

This kind of conservatism is not the opposite of liberalism; rather, it coexists with liberalism and draws from it. Liberalism, after all, cares about "individualism and the rule of law," and, in his view, it depends on "family, faith, community, and nation," so conservatives should have no argument there. When conservatives abandon certain liberal principles, they produce heinous results. "Among the repugnant lowlights" of conservative sins in today's American politics, he names: "animus against the foreign-born carried to the point of orphaning and caging children; acquiescence in blatant corruption by the president and top officials; mindless trashing of the liberal international order and the global economy; restricting the franchise for some voters rather than insisting it be preserved as the bedrock of a republican form of government and confidently competing for the votes of all Americans; and systematic subversion of the rule of law to stymie investigations of foreign tampering with our elections."

He wants opposing factions to stop demonizing each other, and he aspires to see "that partisan identity once again cuts across demographic and cultural identities instead of politicizing them."

"Republicanism," he says, "begins with love and unity: the patriotic love of country, a love that unites all of us regardless of party. However much we may differ from one another, however many distinctions we draw among ourselves in a modern, sprawling, pluralistic society, there is one thing that binds all Americans together as moral and civic equals: the res publica, or commonwealth, under whose laws we all live and within whose institutions we can all participate to make those laws better." In this, I see echoes of Mark Lilla and Ross Douthat. Lindsey says he'd like to see patriotism, "a fundamental moral passion of the right," recast "in civic rather than ethnocentric terms." Republicanism would distinguish itself from the left in its "support for a stout national defense" and its "valorization of the nation's protectors in the military and police."

A few issues here.

In today's United States, citizens are not, in fact, defending democracy. Corruption is unchecked and the public interest is not being served. A political theory may say that citizens ought to do better, but since in fact they are doing poorly, the political theory needs to have a realistic account of that and a pragmatic response to it if the theory intends to be relevant and useful.

He acknowledges that current events represent the country's "darkest impulses," and that "the Trump presidency is not a freak accident, but rather the culmination of developments that have been corrupting the conservative movement and the Republican Party for many years." What I'd like to see is acknowledgment that these dark impulses belong not just to humanity nor even to something particular to the American self-concept (though surely that is true), but that they belong to the conservative movement and the Republican Party, as that is the political house that was corrupted here, and therefore that special ownership for causing and fixing the problem lies with conservatives and Republicans. In one instance, he blames "the left" for its "open-borders cosmopolitanism and outright hostility to nationalism of any kind and American exceptionalism in particular," saying that such advocacy pushes the right toward its reactionary "conflation of patriotism and white identity politics." It is certain that warring political factions indeed fan the flames of their rhetoric when responding to each other's arguments, but pointing out that phenomenon is often intended to blame one's own intemperance on the other side. In this article, it would be nice if that observation were followed by a suggestion about how conservatives could please stop practicing white identity politics regardless of their anxiety about something they heard someone else say about borders and imperialism. He says "a republican movement on the right" could "criticize ethno-nationalism as fundamentally unpatriotic and unfaithful to American exceptionalism." OK, but it seems that movement does not exist yet, so, meanwhile, why can't conservatives simply stop endorsing white supremacy? Why does a highly academic movement need to arise from ivory tower mist and tell them how to behave according to their own alleged principles? Why can't they just stop being racist if they are not racist?

He does say — and he makes this central to his argument — that many white Christians on the right are guilty of "utterly poisonous" rhetoric. He wants "to resist populist ethno-nationalism in the name of genuine conservatism." The problem I have is that he does not explain exactly where this poison comes from. He deems it "deeply un-conservative," a judgment that could function as an excuse for intellectual conservatism to avoid fully reckoning with how it arose within the conservative movement in the first place. If these ideas are not attached by strings to conservatism, why do the bearers of these ideas call themselves conservatives? He begins to blame the terminology of the conservative movement where he says: "under contemporary conditions, the language of conservatism pulls its users naturally and almost irresistibly toward the ethnocentrism and dark divisiveness..." This is at once reassuring (since he is assigning some responsibility to conservatism) and alarming (since it isn't obvious to me what is worth saving about conservatism if the very words that describe it seduce people toward evil). He is a little more specific when he says that language meant to argue against progress, in a social context where the progress being discussed is the civil rights of oppressed groups, "slips all too easily into a defense of the status quo by the traditionally dominant groups." Yes, that is true. He also suggests that today's conservatism uses "divisive culture-war theatrics to mobilize support" because it isn't actually "helping real people to improve their lives in tangible ways," which is to say, if the movement would just talk more and do more about jobs and other material concerns, maybe white people would be more curious and less angry and would channel their energies toward productive conversations and lose interest in being racist. Maybe. But I wonder why white people don't already lose interest in being racist and go forth and have their own more productive political conversations about jobs and other things they care about.

The argument to me sounds like, if only white conservatives would understand what they actually believed, and if only they would stop feeling antagonized whenever they hear a dissent or challenge such that they jump into endorsing some hostile position that they don't actually believe. My concern is that they do actually believe the things they say they believe.

An article like this written by someone who wants a political movement that "cuts across demographic and cultural identities" should also explain why Black people and people of color should want to be in a movement that not only tolerates but indeed draws its lifeblood from white people who are difficult and whose ideas are frankly dangerous to them. These are people who (the author argues) need a counter-movement or revival to indirectly nudge them to stop being racist. Black people and people of color aren't responsible for teaching white people how not to be racist (nor for coming up with gentle paternalistic techniques to persuade or trick them into not being racist in a way that does not require conscious effort from the white people, nor even indeed for waiting around for them to suddenly stop being racist), but then, if they're not part of the new small-r republicanism counter-movement, it will be just another white conservative movement that lacks diversity.

This particular failure is set up in part by the chosen audience for the article: those disaffected Republicans who newly feel "politically homeless." How many non-white Republicans stuck around after the Republican Party's positions during the 1960s civil rights movement? Who are the Republicans of color who found the party appealing for the last fifty years, yet find Trump (OK, maybe George W. Bush) the last straw, but not that much of a last straw that they aren't willing to immediately return as long as all the Trump supporters smile and say sorry and briskly wash their hands? Some can surely be found, but not many. Not enough to Make the Republican Party Diverse Again. What this article needs, then, to succeed in its visionary agenda of rebuilding a conservative movement is to reach out to potential new converts to conservatism and explain what conservatism has to offer them and why the people they'd be hanging out with are not dangerous or obnoxious to them because the new improved old-guard white Republicans who are now new small-r republicans have already done their Amazing Grace (and then some, we hope), all on their own. The movement has to be demographically diverse from the beginning. It can't just be the same white people declaring themselves reformed because they asserted a New Year's Resolution to be slightly less racist and who are then wondering why people of color haven't yet shown up to their party. This is going to take a while. Yes, the Republican Party may face its "day of reckoning," but two years into the Trump administration that hasn't happened yet, and meanwhile vulnerable Americans (and people the world over) are still being targeted, damaged, and alienated, so the bloodshed needs to stop before anyone wants to reckon in a cheerful, fraternizing way with that party or people who were recently in that party. To put it another way: Any discussion of apology, repentance, and reconciliation includes not just the offender's change of heart, not just the offender's changed behavior toward other people going forward, but apology and restitution to their previous victims, which includes being sensitive to the needs and wants of the people to whom they would make apology and restitution, and the possibility that the victims may choose not to forgive or may move forward in their own ways. The "reckoning" is not just an inventory, reclassification, and housecleaning of one's own ideas but a reckoning with other people who are affected. The way to make a political party that "cuts across demographic and cultural identities" is to actually include people of other identities by actually listening to them and adjusting your positions in response to their needs.

Any revisionist narrative that says A great wind blew the MAGA hat up in the air and it accidentally landed on my blond head and stayed stuck there for a couple decades, but now I've decided to take it off, and now I think the sun and rain will grow brown-haired people from the ground in my front yard and they are going to want to hang out with me and collaborate politically with me and with the institutions I like is missing the part about the apology and rectification. All the people involved have agency. Certain things were done, and real work will have to be done to begin to fix it. There is no reason to treat the offense with kid gloves. Treat the offenders with civility so that they are able to participate in the dialogue, yes, but be honest with them about what they need to change.

"White identity" concerns are toxic and cause real damage, so it is important not to use language that is too accommodating toward them. Here is an example where I called out that language in a New York Magazine article by Andrew Sullivan.

An important note about sex/sexuality/gender: When he says that republicanism could "embrace traditional values" (whatever those are — this is a mysterious comment within an article that previously claimed to reject "excuse-making for sexism, [and] demonization of homosexuality"). He cautions: "Those values must truly reflect the broad contemporary moral consensus as opposed to a particular, sectarian conception of the good." This seems to up-end everything else he says in the article. In the article overall, he says that revolutionary small-r republican academics should teach ordinary Americans how to identify and speak better about their true values, but, in this sentence, he says that republicanism can accept some bigotry as long as it's popular bigotry ("the broad contemporary moral consensus") and not elitist bigotry ("a particular, sectarian conception of the good"). Not sure why there would be separate rules for sex and gender topics (where popular bigotry is allowed) and race topics (where he expects values to be more principled).

Lastly, his call for the "valorization" of soldiers and cops seems out of sync with his main point that conservatives today are far too excitable over MAGA-hat jingoism and that they need to tone it down and be more sober and intellectual over material concerns in their day-to-day lives. It is one thing to appreciate the role of soldiers and police, and another to deliberately develop hero-worship. I also don't think that this is enough substance to distinguish right from left. If right and left make peace with each other and can more productively discuss civic issues of mutual concern, such that their only difference is who is attracted to a valorization cult of men in uniform, that relatively shallow rah-rah team spirit (or resistance thereto) will start to pull them apart into dysfunctional factions all over again.

Friday, April 3, 2015

What is neoliberalism?

Liberalism, as Osita Nwanevu explains, "is an ideology of the individual⁠. Its first principle is that each and every person in society is possessed of a fundamental dignity and can claim certain ineradicable rights and freedoms. Liberals believe, too, in government by consent and the rule of law: The state cannot exercise wholly arbitrary power, and its statutes bind all equally." This is well known. Two liberal values sometimes conflict: "freedom of speech, a popular favorite which needs no introduction, and freedom of association, the under-heralded right of individuals to unite for a common purpose or in alignment with a particular set of values."

But what is neoliberalism?

Kevin M. Schultz, Why Everyone Hates White Liberals (Including White Liberals) (Chapter 7, pp 164–165):

The word neoliberalism was hardly used in the English language before about 1980, with its use skyrocketing in the 1990s and 2000s, as scholars rediscovered Foucault's work on the topic and were trying to put a name to what seemed to be a dominant ideology coursing through the world. ... It had a Spanish-language moment as neoliberalismo in Chile, when Augusto Pinochet brought in economists from the University of Chicago to help convert Chile's economy to free-market principles, although most of the Chicago school insisted on calling the system simply 'liberalism.'

Foucault['s]...definition was relatively simple and fairly broad... Americans like Milton Friedman and Gary Becker had taken an economic model and made it the foundation of life.

After Foucault, the history of the term unfolded in similar fashion: as a word, 'neoliberalism' came to mean prioritizing homo economicus, with deregulation a primary goal, government intervention in the economy desirable only to insulate the movement of capital around the globe, and lower taxes as formative policy demands. It also came to signify a worldview by which economic values like efficiency and austerity pushed into domains well beyond the economic, helping decide how to run schools, public transport, and even culture. Its ideas shaped the development of the world for the next half century, from roughly 1979 to today. And it was generally a bad word from the start, one that prioritized economic gains over the good of civil society. A slightly respectable genealogy emerging from bona fide economists had morphed into a worldview that seemed destined to destroy civil society. No one would claim to be a neoliberal.

Wendy Brown, author of Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Zone Books, 2015)

In this book, I treat neoliberalism as a governing rationality through which everything is “economized” and in a very specific way: human beings become market actors and nothing but, every field of activity is seen as a market, and every entity (whether public or private, whether person, business, or state) is governed as a firm. Importantly, this is not simply a matter of extending commodification and monetization everywhere — that’s the old Marxist depiction of capital’s transformation of everyday life. Neoliberalism construes even non-wealth generating spheres — such as learning, dating, or exercising — in market terms, submits them to market metrics, and governs them with market techniques and practices. Above all, it casts people as human capital who must constantly tend to their own present and future value.

She continues,

Here’s where thinking about neoliberalism as a governing rationality is important: this rationality switches the meaning of democratic values from a political to an economic register. Liberty is disconnected from either political participation or existential freedom, and is reduced to market freedom unimpeded by regulation or any other form of government restriction. Equality as a matter of legal standing and of participation in shared rule is replaced with the idea of an equal right to compete in a world where there are always winners and losers.

The promise of democracy depends upon concrete institutions and practices, but also on an understanding of democracy as the specifically political reach by the people to hold and direct powers that otherwise dominate us. Once the economization of democracy’s terms and elements is enacted in law, culture, and society, popular sovereignty becomes flatly incoherent. In markets, the good is generated by individual activity, not by shared political deliberation and rule. And, where there are only individual capitals and marketplaces, the demos, the people, do not exist.

An example? Take, perhaps, Saudi Arabia's recall of its ambassador to Sweden, after Sweden's foreign minister Margot Wallstrom criticized Saudi Arabia in March 2015 for its treatment of women (who cannot leave home without a male guardian and cannot drive under any circumstances) and for its sentencing of blogger Raif Badawi to 1,000 lashes. She went on to voice her opinion that Sweden should not sell arms to Saudi Arabia. Leaders of major Swedish companies voiced their opposition to Wallstrom's comments, and Sweden's king and prime minister struck a note of apology with the Saudi king. Nick Cohen observed the economic importance for Sweden of its relations with Saudi Arabia:

Sweden is the world’s 12th largest arms exporter — quite an achievement for a country of just nine million people. Its exports to Saudi Arabia total $1.3 billion. Business leaders and civil servants are also aware that other Muslim-majority countries may follow Saudi Arabia’s lead.

Cohen said that "the rest of liberal Europe shows no interest in supporting her," and he added that "a Europe that is getting older and poorer is starting to find that moral stands in foreign policy are luxuries it can no longer afford."

The military aspect of neoliberalism will be perceived differently depending on which end of the gun you stand, of course. Writing literary criticism in 2021, Aaron Bady said he wasn't sure "what I mean by" questioning whether "this novel is neoliberalism." To one person, neoliberalism might imply "something more like the Chicago boys and privatization," but, he imagines, another fictional character might ask: "Doesn’t neoliberalism in Latin America come at the barrel of a gun? Wasn’t what neoliberalism felt like, on the ground, wasn’t it a little more like murder than literature?" For many of Roberto Bolaño's generation of Chileans, Bady says, "'neoliberalism' named the very specific reason they also went into exile."

"Neoliberal Chile," according to an article in Dissent Magazine, had been

"designed during the long counterrevolutionary military dictatorship initiated in 1973 and continued with some reforms after the negotiated transition to democracy in 1990. The most tangible symbol of that era is the constitution, ratified by the Pinochet dictatorship's fraudulent plebiscite in 1980. The document consolidated a mix of limited democracy and market economy, oriented around the interests of big business. It devolved social rights previously guaranteed by the state to the market, and at the same time weakened labor and union rights, undercutting the power of workers to organize. It is no coincidence, then, that the recent uprising [in October 2019, Estallido Social] coalesced around the demand for a new constitution."

A 2018 Project Syndicate video said:

“Austerity is closely associated with the neoliberal doctrine advocated in the 1970s and 1980s by the likes of Milton Friedman and Margaret Thatcher, and embraced in the 1990s by major center-left parties, when it became known as the Washington Consensus. The first pillar of that Consensus is increased economic competition achieved through deregulation, market opening, and free trade. The second is a reduced role for the state, achieved through privatization and limits on the ability of governments to run fiscal deficits and accumulate debt. ...neoliberal economists have sought to prove that government spending is either destructive or futile.”

Fiscal consersvative is euphemism for "I suffered and so must you", or "Even if I never suffered, idgaf if you do"

— CJ (@cja70.bsky.social) December 27, 2024 at 6:23 PM

Christopher Lasch wrote in 1984 that the social changes brought about by industrialization

have gradually transformed a productive system based on handicraft production and regional exchange into a complex, interlocking network of technologies based on mass production, mass consumption, mass communications, mass culture: on the assimilation of all activities, even those formerly assigned to private life, to the demands of the marketplace. These developments have created a new kind of selfhood, characterized by some observers as self-seeking, hedonistic, competitive, and ‘antinomian’...Critics of ‘hedonism’ attribute its increasing appeal to the collapse of educational standards, the democratization of an ‘adversary culture’ that formerly appealed only to the intellectual avant-garde, and the decline of political authority and leadership. They complain that people think too much about rights instead of thinking about duties.

This criticism — and its common rejoinder that it’s good to give people options in life — both fail to question, Lasch wrote, “the debased conception of democracy that reduces it, in effect, to the exercise of consumer preferences. Neither side questions the equation of selfhood with the ability to play a variety of roles and to assume an endless variety of freely chosen identities.”

Lizabeth Cohen calls it “consumerization of the republic.” (Hence the title of her book, A Consumers' Republic.) Tressie McMillan Cottom explained it in 2022: "This is the idea that we perform our greatest service to the collective good not by voting or organizing or performing mutual aid but by pursuing our individual private consumption. We buy, therefore we are."

Lasch explained some of the philosophical history behind this assumption:

The highest form of practice, for Aristotle and his followers, is politics, which seeks to promote the good life by conferring equal rights on all citizens and by establishing rules and conventions designed not so much to solve the problems of social living as to encourage citizens to test themselves against demanding standards of moral excellence (for example, in contests of oratorical skill and physical prowess) and thus to develop their gifts to the highest pitch. The Aristotelian conception of practice has more in common with play than with activities defined as practical in the modern sense. Practices in the Aristotelian sense have nothing to do, as such, with the production of useful objects or with satisfying material needs. This goes even for the practice of politics. Only in the sixteenth century did Machiavelli and Thomas More define material survival, the physical maintenance of life, as the chief business of the state. From that position it was a short step to the modern conception of politics as political economy, which assumes, as Jürgen Habermas points out, that “individuals are exclusively motivated to maximize their private wants, desires, and interests.”

In The Midnight Kingdom (2023), Jared Yates Sexton explains the work of the Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek, who

"was a prominent proponent of a worldview that had come to be known as neoliberalism. He vehemently opposed any notion of government interference in the economy whatsoever, forwarding the idea that for it to invest in projects, distribute favors or resources to certain groups, or even make value judgments in regard to redistribution of wealth was for it to infringe on the rights of every citizen. This, he posited, amounted to a “totalitarian state” and violated the entire liberal idea of liberty. Democracy was particularly dangerous, as leaving these issues to the public will would almost always lead to tyranny and result in the society destroying itself because of seductive notions of egalitarianism and rumors of greater freedom. Neoliberalism had emerged in the summer of 1938 as Nazism and fascism gained a foothold in Europe and as the liberal democracies of the world were faltering. Faced with the possibility that the liberal project, with roots tracing back to the eighteenth-century period of Enlightenment, might be reaching its fatal conclusion, French philosopher Louis Rougier summoned the brightest minds he knew to Paris to discuss ways to reinvigorate the philosophy."

A neoliberal assumption is that you don't need democratic participation or political ideology if unconstrained markets are taking care of people's basic needs and if individuals can channel their psychological impulses toward consumerism rather than ideas. This assumption depends on another assumption: the markets will stay intact and continue to function, and will not lose battles to ideologies (anti-capitalist, anti-neoliberal, etc.) As Sexton also writes:

"Designed as a means of separating markets from democracy and ideology, this New World Order would not prove as all-encompassing or unassailable as Fukuyama or its architects would have hoped.

The weakness proved to be its attempt to eliminate ideology. Neoliberals had meant to counter the ideologically driven conflicts of the twentieth century and negate the “dangers” of mass democracy and populism. Believing economics were much too important and complex to be left to the people, they designed a system to transfer democratic compulsions to the market and political expression into consumerism, all while disarming the danger of ideas. But that brief respite, in which the political and economic elite came to believe their system would be everlasting, came crashing down with the towers of the World Trade Center, a structure ironically built to embody the neoliberal project.

"Neoliberal capitalism," says Benjamin Cain, "rests on a modern Enlightenment conception of individual rights. But that status quo was established by a secularization of those rediscovered ancient revelatory insights." Today, neoliberalism implies the privatization of "the prison industry, health care, and democracy."

Indrajit Samarajiva in an October 4, 2022 article:

"...fascism emerges quite naturally from liberal democracy. Liberal democracy is defined by the exclusion of ‘illegal’ people who don’t have full rights because paperwork. Liberal democracy is defined by the primacy of property rights over human rights. It is defined by political symbolism over actual economic power. As Wang Huning wrote, 'the equality guaranteed by the Western system is only formal political equality, not social or economic equality.' This wretched system gets deified through simple hypocrisy and symbolism, but when people's material conditions get wretched, the whole facade comes down."

David Callahan, also briefly: "Liberals have made serious mistakes in the past forty years. In a sentence, they have failed to think enough about either the downsides of social freedom or the upsides of economic freedom."

Boada and Toledo wrote of "el falso paradigma esgrimido por el neoliberalismo de que 'todo es solucionable por el mercado y la tecnología' o de rechazarlo oponiéndole una nueva utopía." Enrique Leff has said, as paraphrased by Boada and Toledo, that "el neoliberalismo está transformando la percepción del desarrollo sostenible en esta dirección: si en 1970 se creía que la causa principal del deterioro ambiental era el crecimiento económico, actualmente se considera que esté es más bien el resultado de una insuficiente liberalización del mercado y de no haber asignado formas de propiedad y precios a los bienes comunes de la naturaleza." (Read more on my Medium article: "Economics Doesn't Crunch 'Environment' Well")

S.Y. Lee:

"The first three posts of my Japanese National Railways series spanned its lifetime between 1948 and 1987 and detailed its political birth and its political death. Created by American occupiers in the image of New Deal corporations, JNR met its end under the banner of neoliberalism promising a rejuvenated Japan through a Reaganite/Thatcherite revolution [e.g., tending toward privatization].

* * *

The major [railway] fare increase [in 1975 in Japan] and continuous labor disruptions marked JNR as a public agency not only financially unstable but culturally as well. This sentiment was keenly expressed by exasperated bureaucrats and politicians who sought to reconstruct Japan’s public finances in the new economic system gaining traction in the West: neoliberalism. Killing off Japan’s militant labor unionism would soon surface as a key desired effect in their neoliberal laboratory of the 1980s."

Siva Vaidhyanathan explained neoliberalism in 2011:

The notion of gentle, creative state involvement to guide processes toward the public good was impossible to imagine, let alone propose.

This vision was known as neoliberalism. Although Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher championed it, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair mastered it. It had its roots in two prominent ideologies: techno-fundamentalism, an optimistic belief in the power of technology to solve problems (which I describe fully in chapter 3), and market fundamentalism, the notion that most problems are better (at least more efficiently) solved by the actions of private parties rather than by state oversight or investment. And it was not just a British and American concept. It was deployed from Hong Kong to Singapore, Chile, and Estonia.

Martin Lukacs in 2017 wrote that Thatcher and Reagan's neoliberalism "has pursued two principal objectives. The first has been to dismantle any barriers to the exercise of unaccountable private power. The second had been to erect them to the exercise of any democratic public will." Emphasizing "privatization, deregulation, tax cuts and free trade deals" has "liberated corporations to accumulate enormous profits and treat the atmosphere like a sewage dump, and hamstrung our ability, through the instrument of the state, to plan for our collective welfare." Labor unions have been undermined, for example. Neoliberalism wants to make the following steps "culturally unthinkable," but these are what needs to happen to lower greenhouse gas emissions: "take railways and utilities and energy grids back into public control; regulate corporations to phase out fossil fuels; and raise taxes to pay for massive investment in climate-ready infrastructure and renewable energy — so that solar panels can go on everyone’s rooftop, not just on those who can afford it."

Eco-consumerism may expiate your guilt. But it’s only mass movements that have the power to alter the trajectory of the climate crisis. This requires of us first a resolute mental break from the spell cast by neoliberalism: to stop thinking like individuals.

Julia Steinberger wrote about neoliberalism and fossil fuels ("What we are up against," June 17, 2024). It's a 30-min read on Medium. Please read the whole thing!

How do neoliberalism and neoconservativism differ? Jared Yates Sexton explains it (roughly 20:00–25:00): They both serve oligarchical interests. Neoconservatives more enthusiastically endorse the myth of American exceptionalism and more directly pursue resource extraction. Neoliberals are "neurotic," handwringing and guilt-ridden about what they're doing.

Rachel Maddow wrote in 2012:

Counterinsurgency doctrine [for example, that produced by The U.S. Army /Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual by David Petraeus, which Maddow described as “a can-do treatise on how to fight wars that were both indefinite and expandable, a full-on twenty-first century rewrite of US military doctrine”] is elegant and fulfilling as an academic exercise, particularly for liberals: the story of how a public entity (that is, the military) does everything the right way, anticipating and meeting a population’s every need, and thereby wins. The idea is that the Iraqis will love us in the end, and want to be like us, as long as our military applies the correct principles.

Stanley Fish, in 2009, said that he has been accused of wanting to neoliberalize academia, based on his arguments that professors should stick to academics inside the classroom and keep their political activism separate. (His critics find this unnaturally limiting for the professors and less than exemplary for their students.)

...neoliberalism is a pejorative way of referring to a set of economic/political policies based on a strong faith in the beneficent effects of free markets. Here is an often cited definition by Paul Treanor: “Neoliberalism is a philosophy in which the existence and operation of a market are valued in themselves, separately from any previous relationship with the production of goods and services . . . and where the operation of a market or market-like structure is seen as an ethic in itself, capable of acting as a guide for all human action, and substituting for all previously existing ethical beliefs.” (“Neoliberalism: Origins, Theory, Definition.”)

* * *

Whereas in other theories, the achieving of a better life for all requires a measure of state intervention, in the polemics of neoliberalism (elaborated by Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek and put into practice by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher), state interventions — governmental policies of social engineering — are “presented as the problem rather than the solution” (Chris Harman, “Theorising Neoliberalism,” International Socialism Journal, December 2007).

* * *

Short-term transactions-for-profit replace long-term planning designed to produce a more just and equitable society. Everyone is always running around doing and acquiring things, but the things done and acquired provide only momentary and empty pleasures (shopping, trophy houses, designer clothing and jewelry), which in the end amount to nothing. Neoliberalism, David Harvey explains, delivers a “world of pseudo-satisfactions that is superficially exciting but hollow at its core.” (A Brief History of Neoliberalism.)

Timothy Snyder, in 2017:

We learned to say that there was ‘no alternative’ to the basic order of things, a sensibility that the Lithuanian political theorist Leonidas Donskis called ‘liquid evil.’ Once inevitability was taken for granted, criticism indeed became slippery. What appeared to be critical analysis often assumed that the status quo could not actually change, and thereby indirectly reinforced it. Some spoke critically of neoliberalism, the sense that the idea of the free market has somehow crowded out all others. This was true enough, but the very use of the word was usually a kowtow before an unchangeable hegemony.

In Robert Wright's "Nonzero Newsletter" on March 7, 2020, he wrote: "Unlike most ideological labels, it ["neoliberal"] is claimed by virtually no one. It's used mainly as a pejorative, typically to mean something like 'a free market fundamentalist who happily does the bidding of corporate overlords, helping them run roughshod over the world’s working people.'" Nonetheless, "it's possible to apply it with some precision. If you follow the term 'neoliberal' back to the 1990s, you’ll find it referring to a distinct set of policies — policies collectively called 'the Washington consensus' — and an underlying philosophy."

“Laying the problems of American capitalism on the poor is a staple of neoliberalism that protects American exceptionalism mythology," Roberto Sirvent and Danny Haiphong wrote in 2019. "American exceptionalism tells us that it is the ‘high-risk borrower,’ the individual who failed to ‘make it,’ who is responsible for whatever economic ailments plague the United States."

In a Project Syndicate interview sent by email on 12 November 2019, Paola Subacchi mentioned the failures of the free markets.

PS: You’ve suggested that neoliberalism is actually a form of social engineering, in the sense that those societies that embraced free-market ideology “have become increasingly divided in terms of economic power, influence, education, and health.” And, judging by many of these societies’ politics today, there has been considerable buyer’s remorse among voters. Which policies would do the most to address their grievances?

[Paola] Subacchi: The failures of neoliberalism, from sharp inequality to environmental degradation, confront us every day. In my forthcoming book The Price of Free Money, I argue that, after the 2008 crisis, the world’s major mistake was to reset the system, rather than overhaul it.

But it may not be too late for significant reform. The key to success would be a kind of “New Deal” that balances traditional economic objectives – growth and wealth creation – with a range of other priorities, including strong social safety nets, equitable labor markets, fair distribution of resources, environmental sustainability, and community openness.

And: How is it influenced by conservatism? Peter Levine, in 2013:

The conservative movement had intellectual forebears, writers like Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman, and William F. Buckley. But its signature policies were not necessarily consistent with any of these authors’ ideas (which, in any event, conflicted with one another). That is not a criticism but a respectful acknowledgement that conservatism was a balance of diverse principles, heroes, examples, and cultural expressions — not a simplistic application of ideas.

Corey Robin, in a 2018 edition of his book The Reactionary Mind:

“The Nobel Prize-winning economist Friedrich Hayek is the leading theoretician of this movement, which is often called neoliberalism but can also understood as the most genuinely political theory of capitalism the right has managed to produce. The theory does not imagine a shift from government to the individual, as is often claimed by conservatives; nor does it imagine a shift from the state to the market or from society to the atomized individual, as is often claimed by the left. It takes what Nietzsche called grosse Politik — a conception of political life as the embodiment of ancient ideals of aristocratic action, aesthetic notions of artistic creation, and a rarefied vision of the warrior — and locates that vision not in high affairs of state but in the operations and personnel of a capitalist economy. The result is an agonistic romance of the market, where economic activity is understood as exciting rather than efficient, as the expression of aristocratic virtues, aesthetic values, and warlike action rather than a repository of bourgeois conceits.

* * *

As Wendy Brown has argued, neoliberalism is, among other things, the conquest of political argument by economic reason."

Will Storr in 2018 defined it as "a heightened form of individualism":

"It’s as if the brain asks a single, vital question: Who do I have to be, in this place, to thrive? If it was a boastful hustler in ancient Greece and a humble team-player in ancient China, then who is it in the West today?

The answer is a neoliberal.

* * *

For Mr. Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher, saving ourselves meant rediscovering our individualist roots.

They cut taxes and regulations; they battled unions; they shrunk the welfare state; they privatized assets and weakened the state’s safety nets. They pursued the neoliberal dream of globalization — one free market that covered the earth. As much of human life as possible was to become a competition of self versus self.

Here's a similar use of the term. The 2020 Democratic presidential candidate Marianne Williamson, "like conservative thinkers, often blames material problems on personal failures," Noah Berlatsky writes. "Her ideology may sound airy and inoffensive, but it is ultimately one of neoliberal victim shaming."

As an example, Remington Breeze said: "as Derrick Jensen mentions in his article Forget Shorter Showers (which is worth a read if you have the time), if every American did everything they could to reduce their carbon footprint, it would only reduce U.S. gross emissions by about 22%."

To some extent, this hearkens back to an ethics question about whether you need to be virtuous to do "the right thing," or whether you can just make some calculation or follow some rule, or whether the situation can be better designed to somehow take care of itself.

"The Political Philosophy of Care," Dissent Magazine, Winter 2022

[Deva] Woodly: If your politics is based on a distributive model, meaning that everything is about handing out goodies—whether those goodies are material or in terms of status and rights—the flip side is a scarcity mentality. That is [political scientist] Iris Marion Young’s argument in Justice and the Politics of Difference. That scarcity mentality leads us to a place where we think that care is not important, because there’s not enough. We are at war, and we have to get the thing that is enough.

[Sarah] Leonard: Sort of a neoliberal mentality, right? Like all historical change is up to me, personally.

Woodly: Only I can fix it, yeah. ... What I think is so promising about the Movement for Black Lives and movements that have arisen in the twenty-first century that center care is they give us a chance to move beyond that twentieth-century mentality.

Adam Piore:

"Bailenson, who has a PhD in cognitive psychology, came to realize one of the main reasons we fail to act on social problems is that we tend to blame individuals for their problems, not any situation or social condition. In social psychology, blaming an individual is known as “the fundamental attribution error.” [The term was coined by Stanford psychology professor Lee Ross.] When bad things happen to them, it’s their fault. When bad things happen to us, it’s not ours. We lose sight of ourselves in the social fabric. In recent years, however, research has shown that granting somebody the perspective of another person can reduce the fundamental attribution error — seeing the world through another’s eyes can make us less quick to judge them."

Lauren Berlant, in their 2011 book Cruel Optimism, referred to "that moral-intimate-economic thing called 'the good life'" (Introduction, p. 2) and asked: "What is the good life when the world that was to have been delivered by upward mobility and collective uplift that national/capitalism promised goes awry in front of one?" (Chapter 2, p. 69) "Neoliberal interests are well served by the displacement of so many historical forms of social reciprocity onto emotional registers, especially," they observed, to "dramatize" the idea that freedom is just around the corner. In other words, solidarity (which might actually achieve a political goal) is converted into individual hope (which cannot, and merely disguises loss). (Chapter 6, p. 222)

The serial killer has "an anxiety produced by obsessional neurosis," Anthony Faramelli says — he pursues "the ecstatic destruction of the object," which means he no longer has the thing as soon as he gets his hands on it and he must find another one to kill. And so: "People who fall in love with serial killers do so precisely because they are the embodiment of the ecstatic destruction that neo-liberal modernity is based on." Faramelli goes on to explain: "This reading of love foregrounds the obsessional matrix of neo-liberalism. The obsessive thought is a thought of jouissance as well as a vehicle for jouissance. That is to say that the obsessive trapped in the cycle where the object is constantly sought after and destroyed is the motor for neo-liberal's libidinal jouissance. For both Freud and Lacan the object at the centre of obsessional anxiety is the mother, that is to say, it is the loved object within the Oedipal matrix. As such, neo-liberal jouissance is profoundly Oedipal, and barriers a significant relationship to narcissistic love in its relationship with death. ... The love that the serial killer exudes is conditioned by the necessity of the love object's repetitive destruction. The killer is identified within the divine love of the object, but must eternally destroy it to quantify the love."

Michelle Goldberg:

Since the election of Ronald Reagan, America has tended to value individual market choice over collective welfare. Even Democratic administrations have had to operate within what’s often called the neoliberal consensus. That consensus was crumbling before coronavirus, but the pandemic should annihilate it for good. This calamity has revealed that the fundamental insecurity of American life is a threat to us all.

“There’s no such thing as society,” Margaret Thatcher famously said. “There are individual men and women and there are families.” Tell that to the families effectively under house arrest until society gets this right.

Christopher Forth on willpower and food:

Having been described as a life-shortening and disfiguring disease since the 16th century, “obesity” became even more vocally denounced by doctors as the harbinger of sickness, disability, old age and death. Demands that people curb their appetites while adopting healthy diet and exercise regimes transformed the body into something that had to be regularly managed through sheer acts of willpower. All of this reflects the paradoxes of a mass society that encourages consumption while simultaneously demanding greater self-control. This self-control, in a further paradox, requires purchasing fitness products and services that are part of the same consumer society credited with producing fatness.

These trends would develop more fully in the decades to come. With the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s, as well as the attendant “culture of bulimia” that coupled compulsory consumption with an equally insistent demand for self-discipline, fatness would become one of the most recognizable emblems of a loss of personal control and a social fall from grace.

Naomi Klein:

"...a core message of neoliberal wellness culture: that your body is your primary site of control and advantage in this cruel and polluted world. So get to work optimizing it!"
— Naomi Klein. Doppelganger: A Trip into the Mirror World. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2023.

Klein again:

"...at least for these trainers, if you aren’t as peak fit as they are, you don’t have a right to have opinions on any aspect of health — and you definitely don’t have a right to ask anything health-related of them. The core Covid- era public health message — that we all needed to undergo some individual inconveniences for the sake of our collective health — enjoyed majority support. Yet it simply could not be reconciled with the wellness industry’s own overarching message: that individuals must take charge over their own bodies as their primary sites of influence, control, and competitive edge. And that those who don’t exercise that control deserve what they get. Neoliberalism of the body, in distilled form."

Klein says that some climate crisis-aware people have this narrative:

"I'll be okay, I'm prepared, with my canned goods and solar panels and relative place of privilege on this planet — it's other people who will suffer. The trouble with that narrative, though, is that it requires finding ways to live with and rationalize the mass suffering of others."

Klein connects it to neoliberalism:

"In Natural Causes: An Epidemic of Wellness, the Certainty of Dying, and Killing Ourselves to Live Longer, Barbara Ehrenreich, who died in September 2022, tracked the ways that the quest for health and wellness became obsessive pursuits in the Reagan and Thatcher era and has only grown in influence since. She argued that this turn was a reaction not to feminism’s successes, but rather to the failures of revolutionary movements, when the high hopes of the 1960s and ’70s slammed into the brick wall of ’80s neoliberalism."

In Mistaken Identity: Race and Class in the Age of Trump, Asad Haider identifies tuition hikes as a neoliberal policy.

Jason Stanley says that neoliberalism rests on assumptions of social Darwinism:

"Once fascists achieve a requisite level of respectability, fascism itself can start to plant roots. At its core, fascism is based on a particular understanding of social Darwinian struggle – hence the title of Hitler’s autobiography, Mein Kampf (My Struggle). And social Darwinism, in turn, is the common bond linking neoliberalism (or economic libertarianism) and fascism. This is why it is no surprise to hear Trump talk constantly of “winning” in business, regularly signaling his disdain for “losers.” Now that he is in the White House, this facile ideology is being translated into a project of national struggle against other countries."

"The fascists have an exit plan from this seesaw; they want to get rid of elections and end liberal democracy. Neoliberals, on the other hand, have no clear strategy."
"Trumpism is unpopular—globally: We have to seize this moment and run with it." J. P. Hill, New Means, May 6, 2025

In a 2018 article for Medium, "Holding Patterns: On Academic Knowledge and Labor," Eugenia Zuroski points out that "minority status...is a foundation of particular forms of knowledge and expertise that universities have a way of recognizing and extracting without crediting." Furthermore, "all expertise is hard-earned," in this case "by living through, and thinking through, unjust conditions of being." It is not automatic or "a natural byproduct of identity." A common "neoliberal fallacy" maintains that people with minority status either they haven't gained real, meaningful, worthwhile knowledge as a result of their minority status or they happen to have such knowledge but they didn't have to put in effort to acquire or develop it; that their minority status is a kind of power or privilege that gains them "preferential treatment"; and that they are disproportionately or undeservedly sought after for academic job offers. The same neoliberal thinking also fails to realize how the academic institution is still built around the dominant identities and supports and rewards them disproportionately while extracting undercompensated knowledge from people with minority status (e.g. by having them serve on diversity committees) and tokenizing those minorities by actually positioning them, or by depicting their position, as giving information or credibility to the institution without having the institution change to really include or reflect them. To use some of Zuroski's assumptions, then, one might say that neoliberalism has to do with upholding current power structures while pretending to critique them (or even perhaps really believing that it is critiquing them when it is not).

"The neoliberal economic paradigm," said Shoshana Zuboff, aims to "reverse, subdue, impede, and even destroy the individual urge toward psychological self-determination and moral agency." More:

"Surveillance capitalism found shelter in the neoliberal zeitgeist that equated government regulation of business with tyranny. This 'paranoid style' favored self-management regimes that imposed few limits on corporate practices. In a parallel development, the 'war on terror' shifted the government's attention from privacy legislation to an urgent interest in the rapidly developing skills and technologies of Google and other rising surveillance capitalists. These 'elective affinities' produced a trend toward surveillance exceptionalism, which further sheltered the new market form from scrutiny and nurtured its development." — Zuboff

The neoliberal urge to turn systemic problems into personal choices and austerity disguised as consumerist choice/personal responsibility is only ramping up. This is just a thinly veiled attempt to start a process whereby reading and producing new knowledge etc is seen as an economic drain.

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— Karl (sad trombone noise enthusiast) (@brainnotonyet.bsky.social) May 25, 2024 at 1:36 PM

At the end of Jeff Chon's novel Hashtag Good Guy With a Gun (Sagging Meniscus, 2020), a drug dealer tells a thirtysomething man: “We felt bad for you, so we kicked a little money your way here and there, gave you odd jobs to do, but we did you wrong.” The drug dealer tells a parable: the pizzeria arcade “used to give you tickets for every game you played,” but kids “stopped loving those tickets when the time came to cash out.” The kids thought, “‘I’m gonna use these to get that PlayStation,’ when in reality all you can probably get is a fucking Calico Jacqueline keychain or some stupid inflatable sword if you were lucky.” In the novel, at least one character who overhears this is unclear what it means. It might mean that money you get from fooling around seems valuable at the time, but it “incentivize[s] children to play more games,” and thus it never gets you anywhere and isn’t, in a sense, real money in terms of its ability to improve your life. If you haven’t earned certain amounts in certain ways, you won’t be able to use them productively — and when you realize that your income has been a scam, there’s no point complaining that it’s been a scam. You should just be glad you had a good time up until that point. (more about this novel)


Erica Fretwell @upstaterica Question driven by idle curiosity: When did


On the political agenda behind insisting that artists make everything "cozy" and infantile, which "is leading to this culture wide phobia of sex which in turn is becoming a useful vector for the increasing spread of fascism":

Jessica Ritchey: So much YA and children's cartoons, and adult Gogurt content like the MCU movies, is about making good soldiers of neoliberalism. This is the best things can be. Don't look to change vastly unjust systems, just figure out how to throw an afghan and mug of tea over them. And love can be a radical act. Love is inherently an anti-capitalist act, it's given freely and expects nothing in return. And sex can be a profound part of that, either in committed relationships or in sheer pleasure which is a worthy end it itself. Neoliberalism always needs to justify things for profit. 'Why is this here? This doesn't serve the plot.' Neoliberalism is terrified of pleasure for pleasure's sake. The idea that you have a sex scene because it's hot. Because you have a right to pleasure.

Neoliberalism promises men 'self-confidence' while giving them only misogyny

Lisa Sugiura writes in The Incel Rebellion: "Bratich and Banet-Weiser (2019) point to the failures of neoliberalism as being the underlying cause for the increase in violence seen within the manosphere. Neoliberalism has failed to give men the self-confidence it promises, instead relying on misogynistic ideas, which has resulted in reactive violence against women who do not comply with patriarchal gender roles for sexual reproduction."

A passage from John Higgs, Stranger Than We Can Imagine: Making Sense of the Twentieth Century, 2015:

Sources

Booked #3: "What Exactly is Neoliberalism?" Wendy Brown, interviewed by Timothy Shenk. April 2, 2015.

"Sweden’s feminist foreign minister has dared to tell the truth about Saudi Arabia. What happens now concerns us all," Nick Cohen, The Spectator, March 28, 2015.

"PS. In Theory: Rethinking Austerity." [Video.] Project Syndicate. July 20, 2018.

Christopher Lasch. The Minimal Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1984. pp. 51-52, 254.

David Callahan. The Moral Center: How We Can Reclaim our Country from Die-Hard Extremists, Rogue Corporations, Hollywood Hacks, and Pretend Patriots. USA: Harcourt, 2006. p. 19.

Anthony Faramelli, "Amour Fou and the Ecstacy of Destruction, or Love in Neo-Liberal Times." p. 208, 210, 212–213. In Serial Killing: A Philosophical Anthology. Edia Connole and Gary J. Shipley, eds. Schism, 2015.

Christopher Forth. "On the Evolution of Fatness in Society." Literary Hub. July 29, 2019.

Asad Haider. Mistaken Identity: Race and Class in the Age of Trump, Verso, 2018.

Martí Boada y Víctor M. Toledo. El planeta, nuestro cuerpo: La ecología, el ambientalismo y la crisis de la modernidad. CONACYT y Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003. (Reimpresión, 2018). (p. 113, pp. 37–38)

Siva Vaidhyanathan. The Googlization of Everything: (And Why We Should Worry). University of California, March 2011.

Adam Piore. "This Is What Climate Change Looks Like in VR." Medium. July 31, 2018.

“Here Come the Death Panels.” Michelle Goldberg. New York Times. March 23, 2020. Accessed March 24, 2020.

Rachel Maddow, Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power, 2012. p. 210.

"Neoliberalism and Higher Education." Stanley Fish. "Think Again" blog for the New York Times. March 8, 2009.

"The Metamorphosis of the Western Soul." Will Storr. New York Times. August 24, 2018.

Corey Robin. The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Donald Trump (Second ed.). New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. pp. 133, 264.

Timothy Snyder. On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century. New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2017. p. 120.

Roberto Sirvent and Danny Haiphong. American Exceptionalism and American Innocence: A People’s History of Fake News—from the Revolutionary War to the War on Terror. New York: Skyhorse, 2019. Chapter 11: "A Rising Tide or a Sinking Ship? American Economic Decline and the Rise of the Unexceptional Majority."

Peter Levine. We Are the Ones We Have Been Waiting For: The Promise of Civic Renewal in America. Oxford University Press, 2013.

"Our increasingly fascist public discourse." Jason Stanley. Project Syndicate. Jan. 25, 2019.

Shoshana Zuboff. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. Public Affairs, 2020.

Lisa Sugiura. The Incel Rebellion: The Rise of the Manosphere and the Virtual War Against Women. 2021.

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